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When we think of the state of the world economy
over the last 20 years, what we see is a mixture of the
good, the bad, and the puzzling. On the one hand, we
in the U.S. have experienced the longest period of
uninterrupted growth in our history. Weve actually
had an extraordinary 17-year run, interrupted only by
the rather short recession of 199091. On the other
hand, this period has also been characterized by finan-
cial turmoil.
Worldwide, this period has seen the greatest con-
centration of financial crises since the 1930s. In the
U.S., the cost of resolving the savings and loan crisis
amounted to around 3 percent of our gross domestic
product (GDP).1 Yet this cost was dwarfed by crises
in Scandinavia, Latin America, and, most recently,
East Asia. Estimates of resolution costs for the Asian
crisis countries are between 20 percent and 65 per-
cent of GDP.2 And there are still rumblings of con-
cern in certain markets. For example, the Japanese
banking system is generally regarded as undercapi-
talized, with official reported bad loans amounting to
over 6 percent of total loans. The true volume of bad
loans may be quite a bit higher.3 Most observers
would agree that financial disruptions of these mag-
nitudes have substantial welfare costs.4
Id like to focus on a particular manifestation of
this problem: the so-called twin-crisis phenomenon,
where banking crises go hand-in-hand with currency
crises in emerging economies. We saw this in Mexico
in 1995, in East Asia in 1997, and in Russia in 1998.
This new development is part of a broader phe-
nomenon that creates both opportunities and dangers:
the rapid globalization of financial markets. This
explosion in cross-border financial transactions
resulted from a confluence of economic, political,
and technological factors. The rapid export-led growth
of developing free market economies, notably the
Asian tigers, especially by comparison to the relative
lackluster performance of many state-controlled
economies, has dramatized the potential gains from
decentralization, deregulation, and reduction in restric-
tions on free movement of goods and capital. Techno-
logical developments have increased the ease and
speed with which large volume cross-border transac-
tions can be executed.
The great opportunity from globalization is that
standards of living worldwide can grow as more and
more countries exploit the gains from trade, and as
capital flows to its most productive uses. The great
danger is that globalization may carry with it new
sources of financial instability and may exacerbate
financial disruptions when they do occur. So Ive
briefly discussed the good and the badnow the
puzzle: How should we respond to these challenges?
This issue is of particular concern to the Federal
Reserve System. The long-run goal of the Federal
Reserve is to promote maximum sustainable growth
through price stability. However, the Federal Reserve
is also committed to safeguarding the safety and sound-
ness of the financial system. The approaches we have
used in the past are designed mainly for national finan-
cial systems. Now, I believe, is the appropriate time
to consider whether these approaches are adequate in
an environment where national borders are less and
less important. In light of recent developments, how
should we proceed?
A good place to start is with a discussion of the
twin-crisis phenomenon: where a banking crisis and
a currency crisis occur simultaneously and feed on3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
each other. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this
phenomenon is the Asian crisis of 1997. What hap-
pened? Why did these countries get hit by a sudden
crisis so strong that it engendered output declines on
the order of the Great Depression?5
First, lets rule out one candidate explanation. The
crisis was not the result of poor macroeconomic poli-
cies. In fact, the crisis countries pursued rather con-
servative policies. Their economies were characterized
by low inflation, budgets generally in surplus, and de-
clining government foreign debt. They engaged in re-
sponsible credit creation and monetary expansion. In
short, these countries seemed to be following the usual
prescription for responsible economic governance.6
Then something else must be going on. A number
of observers are giving significant emphasis to this
twin-crisis argument.7 A twin crisis can occur when
two factors are present. First, an emerging economy
must provide its banks with implicit or explicit gov-
ernment guarantees. There may be valid reasons for
such guarantees. They may reflect efforts to increase
the flow of investable funds. Ill return to this point
later. Alternatively, the guarantees may reflect crony
capitalism or other forms of politically directed in-
terference in the economy. Either way, they imply for
the government a huge potential liability in the event
of widespread bank failure. The second factor in a
twin crisis is that banks in this emerging economy
must rely on short-term loans from abroad denomi-
nated in dollars or other hard currencies.
How might these two factors interact in poten-
tially malign ways? First, the government guarantees
lead to moral hazard problems. They reduce the moni-
toring of banks by investors, so banks are less likely
to make prudent investment choices.8 Of course, moral
hazard isnt a problem just for emerging countries.
We dont have to go back far in U.S. history to find
examples of moral hazard induced distortions. But
moral hazard doesnt seem to be the whole story.
Eventually, it is likely that these poor investments go
bad, at which point the government may feel com-
pelled to bail out the failing banks. The problem is
that this bailout is costly. It acts as a fiscal drag on
the government. There seems to be a connection be-
tween the fiscal burden to resolve these crises and
the resulting currency attacks. Weve known since
the early work of Paul Krugman that fiscal shocks
tend to foreshadow speculative attacks on a countrys
currency. If the government finances the bank bailouts
by borrowing or increasing taxes, its ability to defend
its currency against speculative attack is reduced. If
the bailout is financed by monetary expansion, the
resulting inflation directly weakens its currency. Either
way, the banking crisis is likely to lead to a fall in the
countrys exchange rate.
Where does globalization fit in here? Recall that
the banks in this emerging economy have a large vol-
ume of dollar-denominated liabilities outstanding.
When the currency depreciates, these liabilities become
harder to repay. As a result, more banks fail, requiring
an even bigger government bailout, which in turn
places even more stress on the currency. The banking
crisis generates a currency crisis, which deepens the
banking crisis, which exacerbates the currency crisis,
and the vicious cycle continues.
Notice the fiendish way this twin-crisis phenom-
enon renders national banks virtually powerless. The
usual weapons central banks have in their arsenal are
general liquidity provision, usually through open-
market operations, and directed liquidity provision
through their role as lender of last resort. In a twin-
crisis event, neither of these weapons can be effective.
Open market operations, by increasing the relative
supply of the national currency, act to drive down the
exchange rate. Loans to assist banks in paying off
their dollar-denominated debt simply strip away for-
eign reserves that are needed to defend the currency.
If a central bank is seen to be depleting its hard cur-
rency reserves, a speculative attack is almost inevita-
ble. The government has little choice but to go to
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the U.S.
Treasury for relief.
Now, this twin-crisis phenomenon seems mainly
to be a problem for emerging markets. Why should
we, in the developed world, care? I believe that we
must be concerned. In the modern global economy,
there are numerous pathways whereby weaknesses
in developing countries can be harmful to our own
well-being. Take, for example, the recent concern
about our current account deficit. In the year that just
ended, the U.S. experienced a current account deficit
exceeding $300 billion. At over 3.5 percent of GDP,
this is the largest current account deficit in U.S. history.9
The main reason for this deficit clearly is the
strength of the U.S. economy relative to our trading
partners. However, in recent years this deficit seems
to have been exacerbated by the changing capital flows
due to the financial crises in developing countries. As
these economies weaken, investors who had exported
capital to these countries now look for a safe haven for
their money. The safest economy in the world is the
U.S. This inflow of capital produces a larger capital
account surplus, which, as a balance-sheet identity,
implies a larger current account deficit than would
have been produced in the absence of these capital
flow distortions.4 Economic Perspectives
The way this process works itself out is that
these foreign investors bid up the prices of U.S. assets
and drive down U.S. interest rates. This induces a
wealth effect: Americans see their wealth increasing
and their relative borrowing costs decreasing, so
they tend to save less and consume more. Since this
increased consumption cant be satisfied by domestic
production alone, we buy more from abroad, increasing
the trade deficit.10
While this flow of funds into the U.S. has imme-
diate benefits to us, it carries with it potential problems.
Sudden capital inflows can be reversed. If American
consumers increase their indebtedness in response
to temporary capital inflows, this indebtedness remains
even after the capital inflow has been reversed. Thus,
our record current account deficit could actually
trigger a period of consumption volatility for the
American consumer.
A further reason why we must be concerned about
financial turmoil in emerging economies is that finan-
cial turmoil knows no borders. The danger to U.S.
financial markets in late September and early October
of 1998 was very real. Triggered by the Russian default
and devaluation in August 1998, the resulting uncer-
tainty about who was affected by the default, who was
creditworthy, and who was overextended induced a
widespread drying-up of liquidity. The turmoil that
followed in the U.S. exemplifies how a disturbance
in an emerging economy can be propagated through
U.S. markets in rather unpredictable ways. Additionally,
as a result of this event, the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) decreased the fed funds rate by
75 basis points to ensure a sufficient supply of liquidity
in the economy. In doing so, the committee took a
conscious risk that the monetary expansion would
not exacerbate inflation pressures, with the associated
costs. We believe things worked out well in this inci-
dent, but foreign turmoil of this type makes the
FOMCs job more difficult.
So it is clearly in our interest to consider ways
to respond to challenges of globalization such as the
twin-crisis phenomenon. To start thinking about poten-
tial responses, lets first remember that twin crises
arise out of a confluence of globalization (in the
form of short-term dollar-denominated loans to
emerging economies) and government action (in the
form of government guarantees of bank liabilities).
One could address this problem by restricting global-
izationsay, by imposing capital controls. Indeed,
this approach has been recommended by some, and
has been implemented in Malaysia.11 While there are
arguments in favor of capital controls as a short-term
fix, I dont think this is the place to look for a long-
term solution. The gains from international capital
mobility are just too great, and the costs in economic
growth of restricting this mobility too large, to consider
capital controls as a permanent solution to the troubles
associated with globalization.
Rather, we should focus on the second factor:
government action. A useful set of principles for ap-
propriate government action in the economic arena
are as follows:
n governments should have a clear policy objective;
n they should be minimally intrusive in achieving
that objective;
n they should rely to the greatest extent possible on
market mechanisms and market incentives; and
n they should seek to influence ex ante behavior,
rather than focusing exclusively on ex post crisis
management.
Most important, government policies should not
actively encourage poor choices in the private sector.
The Hippocratic maxim, First, do no harm, applies
to financial regulation as well as medicine.
Since the twin-crisis phenomenon starts with
government guarantees of banking sector liabilities,
lets look at the role of a government-provided safety
net in light of these principles. Governments every-
where tend to provide some type of safety net for
their national banking systems. Presumably, the inten-
tion is to promote confidence in the financial system
and to reduce the possibility of financial panics and
bank runs. Indeed, the Federal Reserve System was
first proposed in the aftermath of the Financial Panic
of 1907. There are a number of reasons why emerg-
ing countries have special pressures to provide guar-
antees. These countries often do not have financial
structures encouraging to investors. Accounting prac-
tices are not fully transparent, disclosure is inadequate,
assets are opaque, and property rights are ambiguous.
For example, at the time of the 1997 crisis, Thailand
did not even have an effective bankruptcy code.12
Similarly, I once met a delegation of central bankers
from a foreign country who discussed in detail the
process they used to impose a haircut on collateral
used for the equivalent of our discount window loans.
This sounded impressive until they acknowledged
that there was no legal basis for perfecting the collat-
eral in case the borrowing bank failed. So what we
see in certain developing countries is the use of an im-
plicit government guarantee in effect being substituted
for the legal and accounting infrastructure necessary
to create a credible investment environment: the kind
of environment investors in the U.S. can take for granted.
While these reasons for a bank safety net may be
understandable, it is clear that the safety net does not5 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
always work as intended. For example, the greatest
bank losses in U.S. history came after the establishment
of safety net institutions.13 The twin-crisis phenomenon
shows how the safety net can result in more financial
disruption for emerging economies, not less. Why
might this be so? The answer lies in the negative
effect of an excessive safety net: By insuring banks
creditors, it makes them less aggressive in monitor-
ing the business practices of banks. For example,
banks in the U.S. held more capital and more cash
reserves prior to the 1930s than they do currently.14
Why? Because the market demanded that they do
so. In the absence of a safety net, investors would
not provide banks with funding unless they were
adequately capitalized.
The insight from this example is that well-function-
ing markets can go a long way to induce firms to
make socially optimal decisions. There is a role for
government, but the best way to fulfill that role is to
encourage markets to do as much of the work as pos-
sible. Ideally, we want to direct market incentives to
achieve the regulatory goal of safe and stable financial
markets, which foster maximum sustainable growth.
This basic principle is the driving motive for
regulatory reform along several fronts. The Basel
Committee on Bank Regulation is currently reevalu-
ating bank capital standards to reduce distortions
induced by the 1988 Capital Accord. That agreement
introduced asset categories that carried specific risk
weights for use in determining required levels of
capital. It is generally recognized that the weights are
not closely associated with risk: They favor bank-to-
bank lending and place much sovereign debt in the
same risk category. Furthermore, the risk weights
favor short-term lending of foreign currencies that
can have profound effects on lending patterns to devel-
oping countries. Some observers argue that these dis-
tortions may have been important causal factors in the
Asian crisis. They create a regulatory environment
where Korean sovereign debt has the same capital
charge as U.S. Treasury securities, and where short-
term loans to banks in developing countries can carry
lower capital charges than loans to American AAA-
rated nonbanks. In this environment, there is a clear
incentive for western banks to channel money to risky
emerging markets. Similarly, there is a clear incentive
for these markets to take the loans that are offered.
By the standard, First, do no harm, the current
international capital standards appear to be wanting.
The Basel Committee recognizes that problems
exist with the current accord and a public comment
period is currently underway to reform the international
capital standards. In its comment letter, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago emphasized the need for in-
centive-compatible regulation, disclosure, transparen-
cy, and market-driven risk assessment. Banks should
be required to pass the test of the marketplace.
One example of how regulation could be used to
promote, rather than suppress, market discipline is a
recent proposal to require larger banks to issue medium-
to long-term subordinated debt at regular intervals to
satisfy a portion of their capital requirement. This
proposal, which has been advocated by the Chicago
Fed since the late 1980s, has recently gained increased
support. How would it work?
Without getting into specifics, most sub-debt pro-
posals would have the capital requirement be modified
to have a sub-debt requirement in addition to an equity
requirement. Why is this more in line with incentive-
compatible regulation? Because the risk preference
of these debtholders would closely approximate that
of bank supervisors. They would be much more con-
cerned with downside risk than they would with poten-
tial upside gains from bank portfolio choices. Because
their debt holdings are subordinated to other liabilities,
the sub-debt holders would be risk-sensitive and
would monitor and discipline bank behavior. They
would demand a higher interest rate from riskier banks.
The debtholders would also have strong incentives to
quickly resolve problems and to avoid forbearance
and its associated costs. Most sub-debt proposals
would impose certain characteristics on the sub-debt
issues, such as minimum maturities, and would require
the bank to stagger the debt issues to force the bank
to go to the market on a regular ongoing basis, per-
haps semiannually.15 The purpose, again, is to ensure
that the bank can pass the test of the market.
Suppose a regulatory framework like the subor-
dinated debt proposal was accepted as a worldwide
standard. How could this potentially mitigate the prob-
lem of twin crises? Holders of subordinated debt of
banks in emerging markets would act as the equivalent
of mine-shaft canaries. At the first sign that bank
loan quality was poor, they would refuse to roll over
their debt or require a much higher yield. Most studies
of U.S. bank markets suggest that debtholders can
distinguish between the asset quality of banks and
price the debt accordingly. In the Asian crisis coun-
tries, evidence suggests that investors were aware
that problems were brewing well before the onset of
the crisis.16 The higher sub-debt yields would send a
clear signal to both the markets and to regulators that
potential problems existed. Seeing this, the subordi-
nated debtholders would start their walk away
from the bank. This walk would be more methodical
and less disruptive than a run from troubled banks by
uninsured depositors.17 This would either induce the6 Economic Perspectives
banks to change their poor lending practices or would
induce the regulatory authorities to take corrective
action. As it happened, the western creditors of these
banks were not induced to walk from the banks, since
they believed that the governments in these countries
would never let the banks fail. Indeed, the crisis
started when the largest Thai finance company failed
and the government bailout was not forthcoming.
That is, western creditors did not move until they
became convinced that these governments simply
did not have the wherewithal to engage in a large-scale
bailout. At that point, the creditors did not walk away
from the banks. They ran.
Is it feasible for incentive-based regulation to be
implemented as a global standard, including emerging
markets? The evidence is looking more and more
positive. One bright light shines from Argentina. The
Argentine government has imposed strong market
discipline on its banking system. Deposit insurance
has been scaled back, banks are required to hold sub-
stantial dollar-denominated reserves, there is signifi-
cant market disclosure,18 and, since 1996, there has
been something very similar to a subordinated debt
requirement equal to 2 percent of assets. These steps
were not taken in response to prodding from western
governments. On the contrary, they were taken in
response to market pressures. Specifically, Argentina
wanted to avoid the high interest rates it was forced
to pay in the wake of the Mexican Tequila crisis
of 1995.19 As the results of the Argentine experiment
become known, other emerging economies may take
similar actions.
There also appears to be a role for international
coordination. In setting required levels of bank capital
to cushion against losses, international standards rely
on somewhat arbitrary criteria and place bank assets
into risk buckets. An alternative to this would be
the use of market evaluations of the banks risk profile.
Indeed the Basel Committee has recently moved in
this direction with a proposed new capital adequacy
framework that relies on external risk evaluations.
Additionally, current international standards signifi-
cantly limit the use of certain capital instruments, such
as sub-debt, by banks. Yet, as just discussed, such
instruments could have characteristics that make
them attractive as a disciplining force and as a cushion
against losses. The Basel Committee has received
comments suggesting that they relax current restric-
tions to allow countries to more fully utilize, and
benefit from, alternative capital instruments. Finally,
the recent Meltzer report on the future role of the IMF
strongly encourages pre-certification before countries
could borrow from the IMF. Part of this pre-certifica-
tion procedure could be requirements that national
bank regulations incorporate adequate market incen-
tives into their regulatory policies.
Now, I must stress that market discipline is not a
panacea. It is a guiding principle that directs us towards
steps that need to be taken. It is a direction in which
we should move, not a magic bullet for all problems.
I believe, however, that market discipline will be an
essential tool for managing the changes that will occur
from increased globalization of the economy.
Earlier, I posed the rhetorical question, Why
should we care? If theres a message I want to leave
you with, its that everyone has an important stake in
how we resolve these international issues. I spoke
earlier about the financial crisis in Asia influencing
our current account and perhaps creating wealth effects
that may lead to problems in the future. Recently, a
banker from a small town in Iowa wrote to me when
he read about a session on implicit government guar-
antees at our May 2000 Conference on Bank Structure
and Competition. Now we typically think of implicit
government guarantees as a large bank issue, just as
we think of international disruptions as being associ-
ated with money center banks. But this small-town
banker understood well how these implicit guaran-
tees affected him and his customers. He argued that
as larger banks encounter problems, their customers
would realize that they were likely to be protected
from losses. Customers would then flock to the pro-
tected bank, causing his funding sources to become
more expensive or disappear. As a result, he would
be less able to fund his customers credit needs. This
is an example of how inappropriate government
guarantees may have unintended consequences, affect-
ing not only Wall Street, but Main Street as well. We
need to ensure that we do what we can to promote the
unfettered flow of capital in international markets as
well as in that small Iowa community.
To conclude, I think its useful to consider how
far weve come. Back in the 1930s, policymakers
believed that financial markets were too important to
be left to the marketplace. The renowned economist
Abba Lerner expressed this view in a remarkable
metaphor. He suggested that the Great Depression
was like the scene of a multi-car pileup, with bodies
strewn all over. A passer-by might wonder what
caused the disaster, until he looked inside the wrecked
cars and noticed that there were no steering wheels!
Lerners implication was that private market partici-
pants simply did not have the tools to avoid financial
crises. Only the government could provide the controls
to keep the cars smoothly riding towards their desti-
nations. More recently, numerous scholars, including
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, offered a very
different interpretation of the Depression. In this view,7 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
the cataclysm was not a result of insufficient govern-
ment action but, of inappropriate government action.
Now, at the turn of the millennium, in the midst
of the greatest prosperity our country has ever known,
we have the opportunity to combine Lerners profound
concern for the costs of financial instability with a
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